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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I )1 in
1993, the civil rights community reacted to the opinion with shock,
dismay, anger, confusion, and fear.2 By contrast, conservatives were
elated and hopeful.3 The plaintiffs in Shaw challenged a North
Carolina redistricting plan drawn by the State’s Democrats,4 who
were in control of the redistricting process.5 The Democrats wanted
to maximize both partisan and racial advantage. Ideally, they preferred to create only one majority-Black district, and that is precisely what they did initially.6 Their redistricting plan contained only
one such district, District 1, located in the northeastern corner of
the state.7 Their attempt to satisfy partisan goals while seeming to
placate the political preferences of the African American community
resulted in a district with a “contorted” shape.8
However, the districting plan was subject to the requirements of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, which obligated the State to
submit voting changes to either the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.9
The State submitted its plan to the DOJ, which refused to preclear
the plan because it contained just one majority-minority district.10
The DOJ demanded a second majority-Black district in another part
of the state.11 Thus, to satisfy the DOJ while trying to maximize
partisan advantage, the legislature added a second and equally
1. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Jamie B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW . L.J. 521,
526-32 (1995).
3. For an article that attempted to temper the early reactions, both positive and
negative, see Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1995) (reviewing
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
4. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
5. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff’d, 506
U.S. 801 (1992).
6. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 634.
7. Id.
8. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 394 (“In order to protect white Democratic congressmen at the
expense of Republicans, the General Assembly had to make that district very contorted.”).
9. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 634.
10. Id. at 635.
11. Id.
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contorted majority-Black district.12 While the first district was centered in the northeast part of the state, this second district was
located in the north-central part of the state.13 These two districts
attempted to unite the State’s relatively far-flung African American
populations.
In Pope v. Blue, a group of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the
plan.14 They argued that it was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.15 They lost on a motion to dismiss, for failure to state a
claim.16 The lower court claimed that political gerrymandering
claims were not justiciable.17 Another group of plaintiffs, not unrelated to the first group, filed a second lawsuit, in the case that
became known as Shaw I.
The Shaw plaintiffs argued that racial gerrymandering, understood as the intentional creation of race-based districts, violated the
Equal Protection Clause.18 The plaintiffs maintained that they had
a right to a color-blind voting process, which was violated when the
State took race into account in constructing the redistricting plan.19
The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs and the case eventually
came before the Supreme Court.20 The question before the Court
was whether this kind of racial gerrymandering claim was cognizable, a question that the Court resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.21
The Shaw decision appeared to present an existential threat to
the VRA. However, as it turned out, the threat was more phantasmal than actual. Though it was not quite as apparent at the time
that Shaw was decided, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for
the Court, seemed to be fully committed to two principles of racial
equality. On one hand, she was committed to colorblindness as an
aspirational ideal.22 Indeed, the very point of Shaw was to bring voting rights within the ambit of the Court’s standard equal protection
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 635-36.
Id.
809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
Id. at 395.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 395-97, 399.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 636-37.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 634, 658.
See id. at 642-44.
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doctrine, which applied an anticlassification framework when the
government uses race in its decision-making processes.23 On the
other hand, Justice O’Connor also seemed to be committed to an
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that allowed sufficient room for race consciousness as a necessary remedy for past
and present structural racial discrimination in voting.24 From that
perspective, which reflects an antisubordination approach to understanding racial equality, racial equality required some modicum
of race consciousness as an antidote to racial discrimination.25
Though these dual commitments created an evident tension in
Shaw, Justice O’Connor saw the value of both race consciousness
and race blindness, and she was dedicated to giving effect to both
commitments even though these twin commitments pulled the
Court’s jurisprudence in opposing directions.26
Less apparent than the Court’s dual commitments to both anticlassification and antisubordination, or to both colorblindness and
race consciousness, was the Court’s conflicted intuitions about
representation in the domain of race and redistricting. One goal of
the state redistricting plans that gave rise to the Shaw line of cases
was to provide descriptive representation for voters of color, specifically African American or Latino voters.27 This goal reflected the
ideals of the VRA, particularly section 2 of the Act as interpreted by
the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles.28 The districts at issue in the
Shaw line of cases represented the State’s struggle to balance
competing objectives, including substantive representation, while
attempting to provide descriptive representation, which they maintained was mandated by the VRA.29 Faced with the stark cartographical evidence of the State’s attempt to effectuate descriptive
representation under the ostensible guise of the VRA, the Court recoiled.30
23. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472 (2004) (describing
anticlassification).
24. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642, 654-55.
25. See Siegel, supra note 23, at 1472-73 (defining antisubordination).
26. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.
27. See infra Part II.
28. 478 U.S. 30, 69-70 (1986).
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
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Though the Shaw majority was hostile to the manner in which
the states chose to provide descriptive representation in the Shaw
cases, the Shaw majority was not hostile to the states’ pursuit of descriptive representation as such, if done in a less ostentatious manner.31 Notwithstanding the majority’s expressed concerns about the
essentialist assumptions that undergird descriptive representation,
and notwithstanding the majority’s preference for substantive representation over descriptive representation, the Shaw majority was
never prepared to forbid the states from pursuing descriptive representation as a legitimate end.32 In fact, to the extent that Justice
O’Connor represented the Shaw majority’s views, she, and by
extension the Shaw majority, believed that the state was required,
under some circumstances, to pursue descriptive representation.33
Correspondingly, the Court’s invocation of the anticlassification
doctrine, which often strongly signals the Court’s intent to strike
down a state’s use of race, signaled something else in the Shaw
cases. It was intended to discipline what the Court viewed as the
state’s unrestrained impulse to effectuate descriptive representation
no matter the costs, instead of making the difficult trade-offs often
required when designing structures of representation. Anticlassification functioned as a thumb on the scale to favor substantive over
descriptive representation, or at the very least to cabin descriptive
representation. Conversely, the Court deployed the antisubordination framework to allow the state space for properly deploying
descriptive representation. Thus, the antisubordination/anticlassification tension mapped perfectly onto the descriptive/substantive
representation considerations.
While the Shaw doctrine pulled the Court in opposing directions,
the Court did its best to manage the tension for almost a decade.
During that time, it was not clear whether the Court would strike
down sections 2 and 5 of the VRA or whether the Court’s standard
equal protection jurisprudence would be applied in a way that
accommodated voting rights as an exception to the color-blindness
and anticlassification ideal. The cases seesawed between the two

31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part I.
33. See infra Part I.
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poles until the Court sounded the call to retreat in the 2001 case of
Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II ).34
In Cromartie II, Justice O’Connor joined the Court’s liberals as
they reversed the decision of a lower court that struck down one of
the North Carolina districts at issue in the first Shaw case.35 Cromartie II essentially put an end to Shaw claims. The Court sent a
clear message to legislatures drawing majority-minority districts
that they would have a safe harbor from such claims so long as they
could plausibly claim they were motivated by political considerations as opposed to racial considerations when they drew the district lines.36 Given the relationship between political and racial
identity, it was not hard for state legislatures to plausibly claim that
their redistricting lines were motivated by politics and not race.
The civil rights bar breathed a sigh of relief. Notwithstanding the
application of the anticlassification doctrine in other domains,
voting rights had survived largely unscathed. And section 2 of the
VRA, which seemed particularly vulnerable to Shaw claims, remained a robust provision of the statute. As importantly, states
were free to pursue descriptive representation unburdened by strict
judicial supervision.
Shaw claims remained buried for well over a decade, until the
Court decided Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, in
2015.37 In Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, the plaintiffs challenged the State of Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan on the
ground that the plan was a racial gerrymander.38 The plaintiffs lost
in the lower court on numerous grounds, including the failure to
prove that race predominated in the way the State drew the district
lines.39 In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined
by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Anthony Kennedy, the Court reversed the lower court and
signaled the revivification of the Shaw doctrine.40

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

532 U.S. 234 (2001).
Id. at 237.
See id. at 257.
135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1274.
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To the extent that there were any doubts about the return of
Shaw, those doubts were erased two years later when the Court
decided two more racial gerrymandering cases, Bethune-Hill v.
Virginia State Board of Elections41 and Cooper v. Harris,42 cases
arising out of Virginia and North Carolina respectively. In BethuneHill, the Court reversed a lower court’s decision upholding Virginia’s
state legislative redistricting plan against a Shaw challenge.43 The
lower court interpreted the predominance standard in a way that
would have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in Shaw
claims.44 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy that was joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice
John Roberts, the Court held that the lower court applied an
incorrect legal standard and remanded the case back to the trial
court.45 In Cooper, and in an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court
upheld a Shaw challenge to two North Carolina congressional
districts.46 Cooper is the first of the new racial gerrymandering cases
to use Shaw in order to strike down race-conscious majorityminority districts as unconstitutional.47
The return of the Shaw cases provides an occasion for a reexamination of the Shaw doctrine—which was thought to be inimical to
the interests of voters of color—and to understand what this new,
incipient line of racial gerrymandering cases mean for the voting
rights of voters of color. We make four points in this Article, in
increasing order of importance and originality. First, we argue in
Part I that the original Shaw cases were more nuanced than commentators recognize. Though the Court’s central purpose in Shaw
was to introduce colorblindness to the voting context, it also preserved an important role for race-conscious decision-making. The
Court’s antisubordination impulse tempered its anticlassification
orientation. The fundamental point here is that the Court in the
Shaw cases was committed to both anticlassification or race blindness and antisubordination or race consciousness. The Shaw cases
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 794-95.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 797-98.
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463, 1465.
Id. at 1468.
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did not eliminate color-conscious decision-making in the design of
electoral structures. In fact, the Court was so committed to preserving race consciousness in the districting context that when faced
with the choice of eliminating race consciousness in redistricting in
order to reduce the tension that is caused by maintaining two theoretical approaches that point in different directions, the Court chose
to end Shaw claims.
Second, we argue in Part II that the doctrinal tension in the Shaw
cases is a function of the fact that the Court was working through
two different and sometimes competing conceptions of representation: descriptive and substantive. The tension is the product of the
Court’s refusal to choose between these two conceptions and its
attempt to allow the state to give effect to both, when the state so
chooses. The antisubordination strand of the doctrine tried to preserve room for descriptive representation and the anticlassification
strand tried to give primacy to substantive representation and limit
the extreme instances of descriptive representation. We present the
descriptive-substantive representation frame as more compelling
than the race and party frame that some scholars have used to describe these cases.48 The Court’s reaction in Shaw is best understood
not as objecting to the state’s use of race per se, or preferring a partisan frame, but to the state’s conception of representation as reflected in the existing redistricting map. The Court saw the state as
too committed to descriptive representation over and above other
legitimate goals, including substantive representation. In response,
Shaw applied the color-blindness doctrine to discipline the state’s
use of descriptive representation.
We then turn to the new racial gerrymandering cases. We argue
in Part III that the new racial gerrymandering cases are a departure from the Shaw cases. Unlike the Shaw cases in which the
Shaw majorities sought to give effect to both antidiscrimination and
anticlassification norms, the new racial gerrymandering cases reflect a new consensus on the Court that favors the application of an
unfettered anticlassification approach for adjudicating race-based
districting claims. This new consensus includes the Court’s liberal
48. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time:
Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM .
& MARY L. REV. 1837 (2018).
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Justices as well as its conservative ones. Indeed, there is a case to
be made that the new consensus is led by the Court’s liberal Justices. Post-Cooper, there is really no such category as an analytically
distinct Shaw claim. Cooper has brought the racial gerrymandering
claims fully within the ambit of the Court’s traditional equal protection jurisprudence.
In Part IV, assuming that we are right about this new consensus,
we assess what this all means for the VRA. We argue that because
the new racial gerrymandering cases do not place much value on
descriptive representation, they are on a collision course with the
primary mechanism for forcing the states to give effect to descriptive representation, section 2 of the VRA. The color-blindness impulse that governs the Court’s analysis in the racial gerrymandering
cases is incompatible with the deep color consciousness of section 2.
Because the Court’s color-blindness impulse is not tempered by a
commitment to antisubordination or by the recognition of the value
of descriptive representation, which was reflected in the Shaw line
of cases, something will have to give. For the reasons that we will
set forth in this Article, we believe that it is section 2 that will yield
to the Court’s attempt to fully apply its anticlassification approach
to the domain of voting rights. Thus, to the extent that the voting
rights community values section 2 of the VRA and descriptive representation, they should be wary of the new racial gerrymandering
cases.
I. THE EARLY RACIAL GERRYMANDERING CASES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY: ANTICLASSIFICATION AND
ANTISUBORDINATION
Commentators writing about Shaw and the Shaw line of cases
have generally focused on the Court’s importation of the color-blindness or anticlassification framework to the context of voting, justifiably so. However, though it is true that the primary goal of the
majority in Shaw and in the Shaw cases was to bring racial gerrymandering within the Court’s standard equal protection doctrine,
this Part shows that the Shaw majority did not replace race consciousness with race blindness in toto. Animated by considerations
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consonant with antisubordination theory, Shaw also sought to preserve a role for race consciousness in voting rights.
At the time it was decided, Shaw I 49 was the most significant
voting rights decision since South Carolina v. Katzenbach,50 the
landmark case in which the Court broadly upheld the constitutionality of the VRA. Shaw introduced, or revealed, depending upon
one’s priors on these issues, a tension between the Supreme Court’s
evolving equal protection jurisprudence and the VRA. When the
Court decided Shaw, its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence was
increasingly animated by a color-blindness impulse in the domains
in which these questions were primarily adjudicated. Specifically,
in the context of education, government contracting, and employment, the Court viewed color-blind decision-making by the state as
an aspirational and constitutional ideal. Race consciousness was an
exception that the government was required to justify. Conceptually and doctrinally, the Court’s approach to race-based decision-making by the state was best captured by the theory and frame of the
anticlassification doctrine, in which the Equal Protection Clause is
implicated whenever the government classifies at all by race. The
standard approach of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is
that courts must strictly scrutinize all governmental classifications
by race.51 And in order to survive this strict scrutiny, the government is required to offer a compelling justification for its classification and the means used for the classification must be narrowly
tailored.52
Prior to Shaw, it was at best unclear whether the Court’s anticlassification framework and the attendant color-blindness ideal
were applicable in racial districting conducted pursuant to the VRA
or justified by the state as a counter to private and public discrimination in voting.53 Indeed, there were good reasons to believe that
the VRA was an exception to the color-blindness ideal and the

49. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
50. 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966), abrogated by Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013).
51. See, e.g., Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644.
52. E.g., id. at 643.
53. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1977)
(plurality opinion); id. at 167-68 (White, J.).
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anticlassification approach of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.54
The argument in favor of voting rights exceptionalism was based
on two observations. First, the Court had largely approved the approach to racial equality in voting as exemplified by the VRA.55 The
VRA was based on Congress’s attempt to address unrelenting racism in the electoral process.56 The Court recognized what it characterized as the VRA’s unusual methods of addressing the problem
and notwithstanding the VRA’s explicit race consciousness, the
Court had largely signed off on the VRA and its most significant
provisions.57 Moreover, the Court’s interpretation of the VRA significantly expanded the scope of the Act.58 The Court went even
further by holding up the VRA as model legislation.59 Consequently,
it was easy to assume or believe that the VRA was an exception to
the Court’s broader equal protection doctrine.
Second, the Court’s anticlassification approach to race-conscious
decisison-making by the state was—and is—deeply and fatally
incompatible with the VRA.60 Whereas anticlassification doctrine
generally abhors race consciousness, the VRA requires race

54. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986); see also United Jewish Orgs. of
Williamsburgh, Inc., 430 U.S. at 161 (plurality opinion) (“Implicit in [the Supreme Court’s
prior precedents] is the proposition that the Constitution does not prevent a State subject to
the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular
districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.”).
55. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
56. See id. at 308.
57. See id. at 327-28.
58. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2015).
59. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-535 (1997) (explaining that the strong
measures that Congress adopted in the VRA were congruent and proportional to the problem
that Congress sought to resolve); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
60. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 181
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“If Gomillion [v. Lightfoot] teaches anything, I had thought
it was that drawing of political boundary lines with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a
predetermined racial result cannot ordinarily be squared with the Constitution.”); see also
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (noting that after Shaw I,
the Court “invalidated every district line drawn on the basis of race ... even though the
districts at issue ha[d] been drawn precisely to comply with the antidiscrimination command
contained in the Voting Rights Act”).
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consciousness and compels the government, under certain specified
circumstances, to classify citizens on the basis of race.61
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the Court’s equality
jurisprudence defines racial discrimination as government behavior
that is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. A law that has a
negative impact on a racial group is not racial discrimination, as the
Court defines it, unless the law was also motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Important components of the VRA operate on the basis of discriminatory impact and not discriminatory purpose. If the
anticlassification approach was fully applicable in the voting context, then the VRA, and the Court’s implementation of the core aims
of the VRA, could not exist in their current expression.
To concretize the point, consider two of the most prominent
provisions of the VRA, section 5 and section 2. Section 5 forbids jurisdictions that were subject to its provisions from adopting a voting
law that would make voters of color worse off than the status quo.62
In order to implement section 5, covered jurisdictions were required
to ask how a new voting law would impact the voters of color living
in that jurisdiction.63 If the law would make these voters worse off,
whether the legislature intended to make the voters worse off or
not, the state could not implement the new voting law or rule consistent with section 5.64
One would be hard-pressed to imagine a similar law operating in
any other similar domain or context, such as contracting, affirmative action in education, or employment. Imagine how the Court
would have responded if, for example, in Gratz v. Bollinger, the
University of Michigan affirmative action case, the university had
implemented an admissions policy that prohibited Black student
enrollment from falling below a certain preestablished baseline.65
Or imagine how the Court would have reacted in the affirmative action contracting case City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., if the
City of Richmond had adopted an ordinance that prevented the city
61. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting
in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 227, 239
& n.66 (2001).
62. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619-20 (2013).
63. Id. at 2620.
64. See id. at 2626-27.
65. Cf. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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from implementing contracting rules that disadvantaged subcontractors of color.66 There is no doubt that these policies would have
been subject to strict scrutiny and there is no doubt that they would
have also been struck down.
Analogously, section 2 of the VRA prohibits the government from
drawing districting lines in a manner that would dilute the votes of
voters of color,67 using the proportion of voters of color in the population as the relevant baseline. As interpreted by the Court, section
2 entitles voters of color to a voting district of their own when they
constitute a significantly large enough portion of the population,
when their political preferences are inimical to that of white voters,
and when white voters vote in a manner that undermines the political interests of voters of color.68 When these conditions are met,
barring the applicablility of a totality of circumstances analysis, section 2 not only requires the government to be aware of race, it commands it to classify on the basis of race.
Using affirmative action as our operating contrasting example
once again, imagine if a university had an admissions policy that
entitled students of color to some baseline representation in an
admissions class or required the university to set aside a certain
number of seats in each class for students of color if the school’s
admissions policy had a disparate impact on students of color. In
light of the Court’s decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,69 which preceded Shaw, and in Gratz,70 decided postShaw, we know that the Court would easily and swiftly conclude
that these types of admissions policies are not only subject to strict
scrutiny, but that the Court would also conclude that these types
of policies are unconstitutional. Racial classifications that are not
tolerated in other domains, such as education and employment, are
viewed as necessary in the context of race and voting. Moreover,
they are not just viewed as necessary, sometimes they are even
celebrated.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Cf. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016).
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
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Until Shaw, race consciousness in voting rights coexisted peacefully in parallel with the anticlassification and race-blindness
framework that increasingly animated the Court’s standard equal
protection jurisprudence. The fact that these two doctrines did in
fact peacefully coexist side-by-side, even if sometimes uneasily,71 is
the reason why it was plausible to believe that voting was exceptional and not subject to the Court’s anticlassification doctrine, until
Shaw.
When the Court decided Shaw and held that race-conscious
electoral structures created to provide representation for voters of
color were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, many commentators and activists assumed that the conservative Supreme
Court would soon thereafter target the VRA, specifically section 2
of the Act.72 They concluded that the race-conscious impetus of the
VRA could not cohabit peacefully with the race-blind impulse of the
Court’s equality jurisprudence.73 And there were certainly members
of the Shaw majority who believed that the VRA was fundamentally
inconsistent with the Court’s broader equality cases.74
However, Justice O’Connor, Shaw’s author and the median
Justice at the time, committed the Shaw majority to two seemingly
inconsistent understandings of constitutional equality: race blindness, operationalized through the anticlassification approach, and
race consciousness, operationalized through the antisubordination
approach.75 Take first her commitment to both anticlassification and
to colorblindness, if only as an aspirational ideal. One does not need
a degree in hermeneutics to see that the central aim of Shaw was to
import the anticlassification model to the domain of voting rights.
Justice O’Connor begins her legal analysis by declaring some doctrinal maxims. First, she reminded us, the “central purpose” of the
Equal Protection Clause “is to prevent the States from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.”76 Second,
71. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167
(1977) (White, J.).
72. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH . L. REV. 588, 639 (1993).
73. See, e.g., id.
74. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 61, at 237.
75. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993).
76. Id. at 642 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
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racial classifications—whether benign or not and whether the classification appears on the face of the statute or not—are entitled to
strict scrutiny.77 Third, racial gerrymandering, which she defined as
“the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the
basis of race,”78 is an “analytically distinct claim” from traditional
voting rights claims, such as vote dilution claims, and as a racial
classification is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.79 Racial gerrymandering implicates the Equal Protection Clause’s equality principle and violates the Constitution when the government creates a
racial gerrymander without sufficient justification.
But Shaw did not import the anticlassification doctrine into the
voting rights domain unrestrained. Shaw also recognized a countervailing conception, race consciousness, as an imperative to constitutional equality.80 This counterbalance to the anticlassification
doctrine was easy to miss at the time because it came at the beginning of Justice O’Connor’s opinion and also because it was
overshadowed by the majority’s attempt to justify the insertion of
the anticlassification model into the voting rights context. Those
parts of Justice O’Connor’s opinion rightfully attracted the most
attention. However, particularly as refracted through the lens of
time and the benefit of hindsight, we can also see that Justice
O’Connor was committed, even if comparatively less so, to a competing principle, which was that racial equality also demanded some
modicum of race consciousness.
In the prelude to her legal analysis, which she self-consciously
styled as historical “background,”81 she took pains from the outset
to place the VRA as a laudable and successful response to a long
and enduring history of racial discrimination.82 She expressly noted that notwithstanding the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which made racial discrimination in voting unconstitutional, the
Amendment was effectively a dead letter in much of the country
even one hundred years after its ratification.83 Further, she noted
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 642-43.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 652.
See id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641.
See id. at 639-41.
See id. at 639-40.
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that even though there had been progress under the Act—the Act
had caused a reduction of racial discrimination in voting by lowering first-generation voting rights barriers, such as discriminatory
voting registration laws—the task of achieving racial equality had
yet to be completed.84 Justice O’Connor acknowledged the fact that
discriminators were quick to find new ways to discriminate—what
some commentators have described as the second-generation voting
rights violations—such as diluting the votes of voters of color.85
One is left with the clear impression from Justice O’Connor’s
“background” section that she and the majority recognized that the
goal of racial equality remained still yet elusive in the domain of
voting. She framed colorblindness against the background history
and present reality of racial discrimination voting. She then cabined the reach of the color-blindness approach. Justice O’Connor
remarked, “Despite [the plaintiffs’] invocation of the ideal of a ‘colorblind’ Constitution, [they] appear to concede that race-conscious
redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is
wise.”86 Race-conscious districting is not always unconstitutional
because the “Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances.”87
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, she recognized that
race consciousness, properly cabined, is necessary in the redistricting process. “That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably
to impermissible race discrimination.”88 “That sort of race consciousness” is indispensable to the protection of the equality rights of
voters of color. In light of the fact that racism in voting is a current
reality and in light of the fact that the discrimination of the past has
present day effects, color-blind redistricting would consign voters of
color to second-class status. Accordingly, the majority not only explicitly refused to import the full array of the Court’s colorblindness
jurisprudence to the voting context, it also expressly preserved
space for race consciousness.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 640.
See id. at 640-41.
Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 646.
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There is no better evidence for the role of race consciousness and
anticlassification in the racial gerrymandering cases than Shaw’s
focus on bizarrely shaped race-conscious districts. As the Court
defined it originally, a Shaw claim is a claim that challenges “redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that
it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races
for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification.”89
The fact that Shaw applied only to bizarrely shaped race-conscious districts and not simply to all race-conscious districts served
to limit the application of the anticlassification doctrine. The bizarreness requirement supplied a limiting principle. Just in the same
way that the application of the anticlassification doctrine served to
domesticate or discipline the use of race by the state, the requirement of bizarreness served to domesticate and limit the application
of the anticlassification doctrine. The anticlassification doctrine did
not apply to all race-conscious districts, only those that were bizarrely shaped: the “exceptional cases.”90
In this way, the Shaw majority could give effect to the two conceptions of racial equality that were often thought to be mutually
incompatible: in redistricting, the state must be as race blind as
possible and as race conscious as necessary. The bizarreness requirement was the fulcrum that sustained Shaw’s ability to deploy
both concepts of equality. The state can be race conscious so long as
it does not draw race-conscious, bizarrely shaped districts, that
would be going too far. The state can draw bizarrely shaped districts, but only if those districts are race blind.91
The Court began to move away from the bizarreness requirement
two years after Shaw, in Miller v. Johnson.92 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court explained that the constitutional violation
89. Id. at 642.
90. Id. at 646-47 (“In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly
irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to ‘segregat[e] ... voters’ on the basis of race.” (alterations in original) (quoting Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)).
91. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH . L. REV.
483, 494-96 (1993).
92. See 515 U.S. 900, 912-13 (1995).
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in racial gerrymandering claims, consistent with the constitutional
violation in anticlassification claims generally, “was the presumed
racial purpose of state action, not its stark manifestation.”93 Shape
was relevant to prove intent and show impact, but it was not a
necessary element of the constitutional claim.94 In a departure from
Shaw, the Court in Miller explained that it was not extreme instances of racial gerrymandering but a racial motive that implicated
the Constitution.95 The Court in Miller promulgated the “predominant factor” test, by which the plaintiff can prove intent in a racial
gerrymandering case.96 A racial gerrymander was subject to strict
scrutiny if “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district.”97
Miller’s focus on racial motive brought Shaw claims closer to the
Court’s standard equal protection jurisprudence and undermined
the position of those who believed that voting rights were exceptional. Addressing the voting rights exceptionalism argument directly,
Justice Kennedy stated explicitly that redistricting cases are not
“excepted from standard equal protection precepts.”98 However,
93. Id. at 913.
94. Id. at 915.
95. Id. at 911.
96. Id. at 916.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 914 (“Appellants and some of their amici argue that the Equal Protection
Clause’s general proscription on race-based decisionmaking does not obtain in the districting
context because redistricting by definition involves racial considerations. Underlying their argument are the very stereotypical assumptions the Equal Protection Clause forbids.”). Indeed,
in many respects one can see the relationship between the Court’s approach in Miller and
other domains of the Court’s broader equal protection jurisprudence. For example, Miller’s
predominant factor test was not too dissimilar from Justice Lewis Powell’s approach to racebased affirmative action in Bakke. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18
(1978). Justice Powell argued in Bakke that race can be one consideration among many that
state universities can take into account in constructing their admissions program. Id. Race,
however, cannot be the sole criterion. Id. at 315. Justice Powell’s approach represents the
state of the doctrine after Justice O’Connor essentially incorporated it into her majority
opinion for the Court in Grutter. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-25 (2003). Following
Justice Powell in Bakke and anticipating O’Connor in Grutter, Justice Kennedy stated for the
Court in Miller that race can be one of many factors considered by the government. Miller, 515
U.S. at 916 (“Redistricting legislatures will ... almost always be aware of racial demographics;
but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.”). Also, like in the
affirmative action context where Justices Powell and O’Connor urged courts to show some
deference to the decision makers, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (holding

2018]

RACE AND REPRESENTATION REVISITED

1577

though Miller undermined the proposition that redistricting cases
are exceptional and not subject to standard equal protection doctrine, Miller did not and could not eliminate the gap between standard equal protection doctrine and the racial gerrymandering cases
completely, unless it was prepared to strike down significant parts
of the VRA. The fact of the matter is that the VRA authorized and
compelled the government to take race into account in redistricting.99 There is no other domain in the equal protection context in
which the government is under such an explicit legal mandate and
to this extent.100
By bringing the racial gerrymandering cases closer to the
standard equal protection approach, the Court in Miller simply increased the tension between the Equal Protection Clause and the
VRA. Eventually, something would have to give. Either the Court
would back away from its insistence that the racial gerrymandering
cases were subject to the same equal protection standards as the
race cases outside of the redistricting context, or the Court would
strike down one or both central provisions of the VRA. For several
years after Miller, the Court attempted to walk the now even more
fine line between permissible race consciousness and impermissible
racial categorization.
The Court eventually decided that it was more committed to the
VRA than to purifying equal protection doctrine. The end for Shaw
cases came swiftly and perhaps unexpectedly. In Cromartie II, the
Court addressed for the fourth time the constitutionality of North
Carolina’s District 12, one of the districts at issue in the first Shaw
case.101 Reversing the lower court’s finding of fact on a clear error
that, although deference was not given to the decision maker in this instance, states do have
a substantial interest that may be served by considering race), Justice Kennedy also urged
“courts to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn
district lines on the basis of race.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. However, notwithstanding the
admonition to courts that decision makers are entitled some amount of deference, the Court
in Miller showed that it will strike down race-conscious state action in the redistricting
context, in the same manner that it strikes down race-conscious decision-making in other
domains. Id. at 927-28.
99. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 594.
100. The arguable exception might be the disparate impact doctrine in the Title VII
context. See generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987).
101. 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
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review, the Court held that the district was the product of a political
and not racial gerrymander, as the lower court had held.
The Shaw cases themselves are a perfect microcosm of the saga
of the racial gerrymandering cases. In Shaw I, the Court held that
racial gerrymandering cases were justiciable, reversing the lower
court.102 In Shaw II, the Court held that the district at issue was a
racial gerrymander in violation of the Constitution, reversing the
lower court.103 In Cromartie I, the plaintiffs challenged the then
newly revised District 12.104 The lower court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and concluded—taking its cues from the Court
in Shaw II—that the district was a racial gerrymander in violation
of the Shaw doctrine.105 The Supreme Court reversed, for the third
time, on the ground that summary judgment was not appropriate,
as there were issues of material fact with respect to whether the
district was drawn for political as opposed to racial reasons.106 The
Court returned the case to the lower court for its consideration of
that issue, strongly hinting for the Court to find in favor of the
State.107
On remand and following a three-day trial, the lower court once
again concluded that race predominated in the manner in which the
State drew the district.108 And once again, the Supreme Court reversed.109 In an opinion for the Court by Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, the Court concluded that the lower court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous
because the available evidence supported the State’s contention that
the district was drawn for political reasons and not racial reasons.110
Cromartie II provided a safe harbor of sorts for the states when they
drew majority-minority districts. As long as they could plausibly
claim that those districts were drawn for partisan reasons—and
given the correlation between racial and political identity, that
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 237-38 (citing Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993)).
Id. at 238 (citing Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II ), 517 U.S. 899 (1996)).
Id. (citing Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I ), 526 U.S. 541 (1999)).
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 258.
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claim can almost always be made—the states are likely to prevail
against claims of racial gerrymandering under Shaw. And so, Shaw
claims were laid to rest.
II. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION
Though Shaw is often viewed as a case that is inimical to the
goals of the VRA, Shaw is underappreciated as a case that attempted to preserve doctrinal space for the states to pursue descriptive representation for voters of color. We argue in this Part
that the best way to make sense of Shaw and the Shaw cases is to
simply recognize them as cases that are about representational
rights and the Court’s hesitant, clumsy, and groping attempt to
work its way through two concepts of representation. Specifically,
Shaw forced the Court to think about the constitutional limits on
the state’s authority when the state is arbitrating between descriptive representation and substantive representation. While Shaw
and the racial gerrymandering cases certainly favored substantive
over descriptive representation, Shaw also attempted to preserve
the ability of state legislatures to pursue descriptive representation
for voters of color so long as they did so within the relative parameters established by the Court. Shaw sought to cabin, not eliminate,
the state’s pursuit of descriptive representation.
There are two ways of characterizing the racial gerrymandering
cases, including the new cases such as Cooper. Some commentators
have depicted these cases as cases that are about the clash between
race and party.111 The race and/or party frame is a serviceable
framework, but it lacks some nuance. That frame fails to account for
what is truly at stake in this domain, which is whether there are
constitutional limits on the state when the state is choosing among
different and consequential concepts of representation. Additionally, the race and/or party setup cannot provide a coherent doctrinal
resolution of the constitutional questions, including standing questions, that are raised in this area. Sometimes the state creates
majority-minority districts for racial reasons—to promote or dilute
the voting rights of a particular racial group—and sometimes the

111. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 48.
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state creates these districts for partisan reasons—to promote or
dilute the voting rights of the in-party or out-party respectively. And
of course, and here is the complication, in our modern political era,
race and partisanship are highly correlated. A race-based district
will have partisan effects and vice versa. In such circumstances, the
attempt to divine the essence of these cases—whether they are truly
racial or truly partisan—is quixotic at best.112
One possibility is to say that these districts are both racial and
partisan. But that option does not lead to a doctrinally coherent
answer either. This is so for two reasons. First, the Court’s racial
districting jurisprudence compels a choice. The trier of fact must
identify race as the predominant factor, not the correlative factor or
the conjoined factor; choosing both is not a doctrinal option. Second,
to say that these districts are both partisan and racial does not
serve to impose any limits on the state. This is because current
doctrine provides politicians in charge of districting with an opportunity for engaging in regulatory arbitrage. As a legal matter, the
doctrine treats race differently from partisanship. The government
violates the Constitution when it creates a race-based district
without sufficient justification. The government does not violate
the Constitution when its redistricting plan is primarily, predominantly, or exclusively motivated by partisan considerations. And, as
we have already established, a redistricting plan can have both partisan and racial purposes and effects. Thus, those in charge of the
redistricting process can frame the districts as racial or partisan
strictly depending upon which frame would be most advantageous.
This doctrinal difference presents an opportunity for a type of regulatory arbitrage by allowing redistricters to take advantage of the
different regulatory structure that applies to functionally the same
act.
The Court could solve the arbitrage problem by changing the law
to limit the government’s discretion when the government redistricts to maximize or minimize partisan advantage. This would resolve the race or party problem. It would also enable us to see that
the core of the issue is not race or party but representation. What is

112. See id.
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at stake in these cases, is a Court weakly wrestling with the problem of representation, specifically descriptive representation. Thus,
an alternative way to think about the racial districting cases is to
look at them simply as cases trying to come to terms with whether
there are constitutional limits on government when the government
designs electoral structures to enhance or undermine descriptive or
substantive representation.
Hanna Pitkin describes descriptive representation as “depend[ing] on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is like,
on being something rather than doing something.”113 In contrast to
substantive representation, in which the representative is endeavoring to effectuate the substantive policy preferences of the represented, the representative, in descriptive account, is not acting on
behalf of the represented as much as she is standing in for them.114
The representative is a reflection of the represented. What representation means in this context is “resemblance, reflection, [and] accurate [descriptive] correspondence.”115 Descriptive representation
reduces, if not eliminates, the principal-agent problem that is
endemic to the concept of representation.116 At least theoretically, if
the representative is chosen not because he or she was authorized
or delegated by the principal, but by being a mirror image or the
essence of the principal, the representative, ipso facto, “reflects” the
views of the principal, the representative is much more likely to
understand and implement the preferences of the principal because
the representative is just like the principal, the principal’s mirror
image.117 As such, descriptive representation is particularly useful
when thinking about the best way to represent racial, political, or
numerical minorities.118 A member of the minority group can “stand
for” the group, and because she is a member of the group, she will
inherently understand what the group wants; she is a reflection of

113. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN , THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 62.
116. For an introduction, see Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent
Models, 8 ANN . REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005).
117. See PITKIN , supra note 113, at 61.
118. See, e.g., Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POLITICS 628 (1999).
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the group’s interests, so the theory goes.119 This is the concept of
representation against which the Court recoiled in the Shaw cases.
One of the more vexing questions about Shaw has always been to
figure out the constitutional harm at issue. A Shaw claim, at least
in the original Shaw case, was one in which the Court would strictly
scrutinize “redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that
it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race.’”120 Shaw claims
were unlike the two types of voting rights claims that the Court had
previously found objectionable on constitutional grounds, vote denial and vote dilution cases.
Shaw claims were also unlike the types of racial discrimination
claims that the Court concluded violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In the equal protection context, race-based decision-making
by the state violated the Equal Protection Clause either because the
government targeted the individual for disadvantage because of the
individual’s race or because the use of race by the state was per se
unconstitutional notwithstanding whether the individual suffered
material disadvantage.121 Shaw claims did not fall into either of
these categories. As we note above, the Shaw majority stated explicitly that taking race into account was not a per se violation of
the Equal Protection Clause in the racial gerrymandering context.
Thus, the harm was not race-conscious state action per se. With
respect to material disadvantage, the plaintiffs did not articulate
how they were materially disadvantaged. For example, they did not
maintain that the state’s racial gerrymander would make it less
likely for them to get the type of constituency service or legislation
that they would prefer.122 Because the plaintiffs had no claim
whatsoever to be placed in a particular district and there was no
reason to believe that being placed in one district is better or worse
than another, it would have been difficult for the plaintiffs to claim
that they were disadvantaged or harmed simply because of which
district they were placed in by the state.123 Shaw’s claims did not
easily fit into theories of harm in the voting or race context as those
119. See PITKIN , supra note 113, at 61.
120. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
121. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 597-98.
122. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 494.
123. See id.
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theories were articulated in prior cases.124 Shaw’s theory of harm
was a bit inchoate.
The bizarre shape of the district was thought to supply Shaw’s
conception of constitutional harm.125 As Professors Richard Pildes
and Richard Niemi stated, Shaw recognized an expressive harm.126
Pildes and Niemi argued that bizarrely shaped districts communicate a message or signal to government officials and the electorate
that “race has become paramount and dwarfed all other, traditionally relevant criteria.”127 From the point of view of the Shaw majority, race-conscious bizarrely shaped districts “are in-your-face visual
representations of racial interest as raw political power.”128 To
slightly paraphrase the late John Hart Ely, when the state draws a
bizarrely shaped race-conscious district, the state sends a message
to the electorate that there is no length to which the government
will not go to help Black people.129 The bizarre shape communicates
the state’s preference for helping one racial group no matter the
cost.130 The bizarre shape of the district is the instantiation of the
extreme racial behavior by the state, of the excessive use of race,
and of the extreme reliance on race by the state.131
But these explanations of the relationship between the bizarre
shape and the constitutional harm are incomplete. They do not tell
us what it is about the use of race in this particular way that the
Court found objectionable. The Court in Shaw was not simply objecting to a racial interest as raw political power; it was objecting to
the manner in which political power was deployed to design electoral structures on the basis of descriptive representation.132 In the
124. Indeed, one of the important questions following the Court’s decision in Shaw was how
standing would be conceived and conferred. See generally John Hart Ely, Commentary,
Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576 (1997).
125. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 61, at 236; Rubin, supra note 60, at 138-40;
see also Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 609.
126. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 91, at 506-07 (“An expressive harm is one that results from
the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about.”).
127. Id. at 501.
128. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 61, at 241.
129. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN . L. REV. 607,
615 (1998).
130. Id.
131. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 608-10.
132. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993).
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Court’s terms, it was objecting to “district[s] obviously ... created
solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group.”133
In one of the most recognized lines from the opinion, the majority
exclaimed “that reapportionment is one area in which appearances
do matter.”134 Appearances matter because of the message that
appearances communicate to the represented and the representatives. To those being represented, bizarrely drawn race-conscious
districts communicate the message that political identity ought to
be first and foremost racial.135 Or put differently, these districts
communicate the primacy and normativity of descriptive representation, that voters of a particular race are best represented by a representative of that race.136 This normative claim is what the Court
has summarized on numerous occasions as an “impermissible racial
stereotype[ ].”137
The Court viewed descriptive representation as a representational harm.138 Shaw took issue with the central normative claim of
descriptive representation: that representation tracks identity. As
the Court put it in Shaw, the constitutional worry is the proposition
“that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live—
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls.”139
To the representative, those districts communicate a similar
message, which is that she ought to understand her task as standing in for her race. She ought not view herself as representing her
party, ideology, or substantive views, but as speaking for her race.
As the Court said, the problem with descriptive representation is
that the representative believes her “primary obligation is to represent only the members of [her racial] group, rather than [her]

133. Id.
134. Id. at 647.
135. Id.
136. See PITKIN , supra note 113, at 61.
137. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
630-31 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990)).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995).
139. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
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constituency as a whole.”140 The normative primacy of descriptive
representation is “antithetical to our system of representative
democracy.”141
Correspondingly, the doctrinal moves in Shaw were in the service of enforcing the Court’s vision of the relationship between race
and representation. Thus, the tug-of-war between the anticlassification and antisubordination camps mirrored precisely the Court’s
struggle to understand the constitutional limits to effectuating descriptive or substantive representation.142 The Court’s theoretical
conception of representation informed its constitutional doctrine. As
the core aim of Shaw was to privilege substantive representation
over descriptive representation, the core aim of the doctrine was to
privilege anticlassification over antisubordination. Similarly, as a
secondary aim of Shaw was to preserve room for the state to pursue
descriptive representation, the Court’s antisubordination doctrine
was deployed to achieve that objective. Shaw’s tension and sometimes incoherence was its attempt to hold on to these two strands.
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE NEW RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
CASES
When the Court essentially retreated from strictly policing the
boundaries of racial gerrymandering in Cromartie II, it thereby signaled its commitment to race consciousness and descriptive representation at the expense of its anticlassification jurisprudence. We
argue in this Part that the new racial gerrymandering cases, unlike
the Shaw line of cases, are much less committed, if at all, to race
consciousness and to Shaw’s antisubordination strand. There seems
to be an emerging new consensus on the current Court that deploys
the anticlassification framework to the near exclusion of the antisubordination approach and that privileges colorblindness and
strictly limits race-conscious districting.
In order to see this emergent consensus, we look closely at Cooper
v. Harris. In Cooper, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s
140. Id. at 648.
141. Id.
142. See generally Siegel, supra note 23 (describing the debate between anticlassification
and antisubordination principles).
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findings that the North Carolina legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause when it racially gerrymandered two of the State’s
congressional districts, District 1 in the northeastern part of the
state, and District 12 in the south-central part of the state.143 The
State argued that it created District 1 as a majority-minority district in order to comply with the VRA.144 It argued that it created the
second district, District 12, so as to politically gerrymander Democrats and not African American voters; partisan consideration, it
maintained, not race, was the motivating factor in the construction
of the district.145
Given the significant divisions on the Court over the Shaw doctrine, the Cooper Court was surprisingly and significantly less fractured than the Shaw Court. In fact, Justice Kagan wrote for a
unanimous Court when she concluded that race was the predominant reason that the State created District 1, and that the VRA did
not justify the State’s intentional decision to construct the district
as a majority-minority district. Since the Court promulgated the
Shaw doctrine, Cooper is the first time that the liberals on the Court
agreed to strike down a majority-minority district on the ground
that it was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
The Court was not quite as harmonious when it came to District
12. However, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by none
other than Justice Clarence Thomas, who teamed with the Court’s
liberals, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer, to strike down
District 12.146 In contrast to Shaw, it was the conservatives in
Cooper—minus Justice Thomas—in an opinion by Justice Alito, who
made the argument that race was not predominant. Justice Alito’s
opinion dissented from the Court’s constitutional analysis of District
12 and argued that the district was drawn for partisan reasons.
Also unlike Shaw, in which the majority opinion attempted to
accommodate both antidiscrimination and anticlassification approaches, Justice Kagan’s doctrinal analysis of North Carolina’s
majority-minority congressional districts applied the Court’s anticlassification jurisprudence matter-of-factly and without any con143.
144.
145.
146.

Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465, 1481-82 (2017).
Id. at 1466.
Id. at 1473.
Id. at 1463.
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cession to the antisubordination approach. Cooper moves the Court’s
Shaw jurisprudence strongly in the direction of anticlassification
and away from any consideration of antisubordination. Consider
four observations from the opinion in support of our claim.
First, from the outset, Justice Kagan frames the legal standard
in anticlassification terms. She characterizes the State’s linedrawing in a manner that would have been very familiar to the Justices who were in the majority in the Shaw cases: race-based
districting is racial separation, which, like any other racial classification or government action that separates voters on the basis of
race, is entitled to strict scrutiny. Quoting from Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a racial
gerrymandering case the Court decided just a few months before
Cooper, Justice Kagan stated, “The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment limits racial gerrymanders in legislative
districting” and “prevents a State, in the absence of ‘sufficient
justification,’ from ‘separating its citizens into different voting
districts on the basis of race.’”147 To the Court in Cooper, the intentional creation of majority-minority districts is a racial classification
that separates voters on the basis of race. To the extent that there
is any doubt, the Court in Bethune-Hill stated emphatically, “The
Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit misshapen districts. It
prohibits unjustified racial classifications.”148 When the government
draws districts on the basis of race, the government is engaging in
a racial classification, which demands strict scrutiny by a reviewing
court. This legal proposition, though fiercely contested in Shaw,149
after the Court’s decisions in Cooper and Bethune-Hill, is now
settled doctrine.150
Second, Cooper, in the parlance of the anticlassification approach,
characterizes the State’s desire to create a majority-minority district
147. Id. (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017)).
148. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798 (2017).
149. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 667 (1993) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 679 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 680-81 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. The Court in Bethune-Hill pretty much admitted as much. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at
798 (noting that the government’s argument in that case, which depended upon Shaw’s
antisubordination strand, “might have been reconcilable with this Court’s case law at an
earlier time” and that “[c]ertain language in Shaw I can be read to support” the State’s
argument).
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as a racial quota. In her analysis of District 1, Justice Kagan argued
that strict scrutiny was warranted because the State was committed
to creating the district as a majority-minority district, which she
defined as a quota.151 She maintained that North Carolina “purposefully established a racial target” in the construction of the district.152
The racial target or quota was not a specific percentage, but the
State’s intention to draw a majority-minority district, a district in
which “African-Americans should make up no less than a majority
of the voting-age population.”153 Given this “announced racial target,” strict scrutiny was necessary.154
Cooper’s characterization of the State’s bare desire to create a
majority-minority district as the equivalent to a racial target is a
significant development in the doctrine. Though prior cases had
held that the intent to create a majority-minority district constitutes discriminatory purpose, requiring strict scrutiny, the Court had
never before held that intent to create a majority-minority district
is itself a racial target. The Court in Cooper effectively equates
North Carolina’s intent to create a majority-minority district with
an intent that the district constitutes a specific percentage of voters
of a particular race, say 55 or 60 percent. This would be equivalent
to saying, in the affirmative action in higher education context, for
example, that the desire to engage in race-conscious affirmative
action is ipso facto equivalent to a racial target or quota. The Court
has concluded that the state is committed to a racial quota only
when the state is committed to a specific number; not when the
state intends to be race conscious or to take race into account. A fundamental tenet of the Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence is
that racial targets or quotas are almost per se unconstitutional. By
invoking the language of a racial target, the majority in Cooper
sends a strong signal that the district at issue is fatally and irredeemably flawed.
Third, the majority in Cooper limits the state’s ability to prevent
a districting plan from having a disparate impact on an identifiable

151. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
152. Id. at 1468.
153. Id. (defining the racial target as the fact that the State’s mapmakers “repeatedly told
their colleagues that District 1 had to be majority-minority”).
154. Id. at 1469.
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racial group. The Court in Cooper held that the government cannot
use section 2 of the VRA to justify drawing a majority-minority district, unless the state first demonstrates that a race-blind districting plan would dilute the voting power of the putative plaintiffs. In
Cooper, North Carolina argued that creating District 1 as a majority-minority district was necessary because otherwise the State
would be subject to liability under section 2 of the VRA, which forbids the government from diluting the votes of voters of color.155
Justice Kagan disagreed.156 She argued that North Carolina did not
have a good reason to believe that it would have violated section 2
if it had not created District 1 as a majority-minority district.157 This
was because putative plaintiffs could not meet all three Gingles
preconditions.158
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court held that a racial group that
is a minority in the relevant electorate can allege that the majority
diluted its voting power under section 2 of the Act if the minority
could meet three preconditions.159 First, the minority group must be
large enough to constitute a numerical majority in a compact singlemember district.160 Second, the minority group must have the same
political preferences.161 Third, the majority group must vote as a bloc
to defeat the political preferences of the minority.162 Further, in
Bush v. Vera, the Court held that avoiding section 2 liability could
not serve as a compelling justification for taking race into account
in districting, unless the state had a “strong basis in evidence” that
its redistricting plan would have violated section 2.163
Justice Kagan argued that North Carolina did not have a good
reason or strong basis in evidence to believe that it would violate
section 2 if it did not create District 1 as a majority-minority district.164 This was because potential plaintiffs would not be able to
meet the third Gingles precondition that the majority group votes
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1468-69.
Id. at 1471.
Id.
Id. at 1470-71.
478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993)).
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1470-71 (2017).
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as a bloc to defeat the political preferences of the racial minority.165
Justice Kagan argued that for two decades, white voters in District
1 voted in a manner that was consistent with the political preferences of Black voters.166 Moreover, and more importantly, the Court
stated that the State failed to determine whether a race-blind
districting process would have led to a violation of section 2.167 Given
that white voters in the district have historically voted for candidates preferred by the district’s voters of color, the State should
have first created the district without taking race into account and
determined whether the crossover voting by white voters would
have continued.168 If white voters maintained their history of crossover voting, then potential plaintiffs would not be able to meet the
third Gingles precondition, which would mean that the State would
have no reason to worry about liability under section 2.169 Consequently, potential section 2 liability could not serve as a compelling
reason for the State to use race in creating District 1.170 Thus, the
Court upheld the lower court’s determination that District 1 was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.171 Cooper firmly establishes
that the use of race has to be remedial.
Fourth, the Court in Cooper sought to limit the practice of racial
districting by making it easier for plaintiffs to prevail in these types
of claims. Consider the Court’s analysis of District 12. North Carolina argued that District 12 was not created as a racial gerrymander but as a political gerrymander.172 The State maintained that its
goal was not to undermine the representation of African Americans,
but to minimize the representation of Democrats.173 The plaintiffs
presented evidence to show that North Carolina moved tens of
thousands of white voters out of the district and tens of thousands
of Black voters into the district to create a majority-minority
165. Id. at 1470.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1471 (“[E]ven more important, North Carolina can point to no meaningful legislative inquiry into ... whether a new, enlarged District 1, created without a focus on race ...
could lead to § 2 liability.”).
168. See id. at 1472.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1473.
173. Id.
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district.174 The plaintiffs argued that North Carolina believed that
it needed to do so to obtain preclearance from the Justice Department pursuant to section 5 of the VRA.175 In affirming the lower
court, Justice Kagan reasoned that it was possible to view the evidence as supporting either the plaintiffs’ or the State’s version of the
facts and though the Court might have decided the issue differently
were it the trier of fact, the standard of review compelled the Court
to affirm the lower court’s decision unless that decision was based
upon clear error.176
The most significant part of the Court’s analysis of District 12’s
constitutionality addressed an argument offered by the State and
supported by Justice Samuel Alito in his dissent with respect to the
type of proof that plaintiffs ought to offer in mixed motive redistricting cases. Justice Alito argued in his dissent that when racial and
political identity are highly correlated and when the state maintains
that its line-drawing was influenced by political justifications and
not racial motivations, the Court’s prior precedents, specifically
Cromartie II, require plaintiffs to present evidence in the form of an
alternative map demonstrating that the state could have achieved
its political goals without the racial effect.177
Justice Kagan and the majority disagreed with the dissent’s read
of Cromartie II. Justice Kagan argued that the Court’s statement in
Cromartie II must be understood within the context of the nature of
the evidence of racial motivation presented by the plaintiffs in that
case. “The direct evidence of a racial gerrymander ... [in Cromartie
II] was extremely weak,” she stated.178 In light of the nature of the
evidence, she argued, the Cromartie II Court required the plaintiffs
to present an alternative map that would have met the State’s goals
without having the racial effect.179 By contrast, she maintained that
the plaintiffs in Cooper presented direct evidence of the State’s
174. Id. at 1474.
175. Id. at 1475.
176. Id. at 1478 (“Maybe we would have evaluated the testimony differently had we presided over the trial; or then again, maybe we would not have. Either way ... we are far from
having a ‘definite and firm conviction’ that the District Court made a mistake in concluding
from the record before it that racial considerations predominated in District 12’s design.”).
177. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 1481 (majority opinion).
179. Id.
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motive supporting a claim of racial gerrymander.180 Therefore, they
were not required to produce a Cromartie II alternative map.181
Notwithstanding Justice Kagan’s post-hoc justification of Cromartie II, Justice Alito has the better read of the case. Cromartie II did
not say anything about the nature of the plaintiff ’s evidence. The
Court clearly stated in Cromartie II:
In a case such as this one where majority-minority districts ...
are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively
drawn boundaries must show at the least that the legislature
could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional
districting principles.182

As Justice Thomas argued in his Cromartie II dissenting opinion,
the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the lower court’s
decision.183 Justice Thomas was clearly right that the Court’s
detailed and factual review of the lower court’s findings of fact in
Cromartie II was not consistent with the standard of review, which
required the reviewing court to uphold the lower court’s judgment
unless its factual findings were clearly erroneous.
But Justice Kagan’s move in Cooper is consonant with Cromartie
II in this respect. The Cromartie II Court sought to make the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs consistent with its doctrinal orientation. Cromartie II pushed the Court away from anticlassification
and toward antisubordination as a way of limiting Shaw claims.
Cromartie II ’s evidentiary requirement is synchronistic with its
doctrinal orientation.
Cooper also makes the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs consistent
with the Court’s doctrinal orientation. Cooper relaxed the evidentiary burden in mixed motive cases to make the evidentiary burden
consistent with the Court’s anticlassification approach and the
Court’s broader equal protection doctrine. As Justice Kagan stated
in Cooper, “[I]n no area of our equal protection law have we forced
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001).
Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs to submit one particular form of proof to prevail.”184 More
tellingly, she stated in justifying this reinterpretation of Cromartie
II: “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the unjustified drawing
of district lines based on race.”185
Racial gerrymandering cases are now adjudicated exclusively
through the anticlassification framework. Just like other areas of
equal protection law, what matters in the districting context is determining whether the government has classified on the basis of
race and whether it has good reason for doing so. This is the consensus of the new racial gerrymandering cases.
IV. THE END OF SECTION 2?
If we are right that there is new consensus on the Court toward
an anticlassification approach, what are the implications of this new
consensus for the VRA? In this Part, we explore three possibilities.
We warn that Cooper may signal the end for section 2 of the VRA.
It is tempting to view the new racial gerrymandering cases as a
victory for voting rights plaintiffs. And perhaps they are, at least in
the short term. Voters of color were among the plaintiffs in the new
racial gerrymandering cases and they prevailed. Indeed, the three
plaintiffs in Cooper are African American. The new racial gerrymandering cases seem to have used the Shaw doctrine to preclude the
government from using race in a manner that would dilute the
political power of voters of color.186
The original racial gerrymandering claims from the Shaw line of
cases were filed by white voters who challenged majority-minority
districts created by state legislatures—most often state legislatures
controlled by Democrats—that attempted to maximize the partisan
political power of Democrats while providing whatever descriptive
representation for voters of color they needed to comply with the
VRA.187 The Democrats, when they were in charge of the redistricting process, attempted to minimize the trade-off between descriptive

184. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1479 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977)).
185. Id. at 1480.
186. See, e.g., id. at 1469.
187. See, e.g., Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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representation and substantive representation for voters of color.188
And they sometimes did so by stringing together geographically
dispersed populations into districts that were not always aesthetically attractive.189 The Court’s decision in Shaw and its progeny
forced mapmakers to choose between the descriptive and substantive representation for voters of color by constraining the ability of
the line-drawers to efficiently spread voters of color.
By contrast, the new racial gerrymandering cases minimize that
trade-off. In comparison to the Shaw cases, which were filed by
white voters, the new racial gerrymandering cases are brought by
voters of color and Democrats who are not challenging majorityminority districts per se, but the percentage of voters of color in
legislative districts drawn by state legislatures controlled by Republicans.190 From the perspective of voters of color, they were inefficiently grouped in these types of districts, districts that forced a
trade-off between their descriptive and substantive representation.
State legislatures respond that they drew these districts in order to
comply with federal law, and specifically the VRA.191 It is only a
happy coincidence that while seeking to maintain descriptive representation for voters of color, these districts minimize the political
power of the Democratic Party and maximize the political power of
the Republican Party.192 In Cooper, the Court was unanimous in its
view that race may not be used excessively without the proper
justification.193 Moving forward, states should no longer be able to
pack voters of color into districts under the guise of complying with
the VRA. Thus, it is tempting to view Cooper and the new racial gerrymandering cases as victories for voters of color.194
But the conclusion that the case is a victory for voters of color
may be too facile and only ineluctable if we ignore the fact that the
new racial gerrymandering cases exhibit a commitment from a
unanimous Court to colorblindness as a constitutional principle in
188. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 61, at 292-94.
189. See id. at 247.
190. See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1466, 1467-68.
191. Id. at 1468.
192. See Ely, supra note 129, at 618.
193. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472, 1481-82.
194. For an article that anticipated this outcome and provides a very good explanation of
the outcome of the new racial gerrymandering cases, see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden,
Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011).
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districting and an aversion to descriptive representation.195 If we
understand descriptive representation as achieved through the
crafting of majority-minority districts, Cooper has certainly made
the crafting of such districts more difficult.
North Carolina’s argument in Cooper, after all, was that it
created District 1 in order to provide descriptive representation for
the State’s African American citizens. Justice Kagan not only
rejected North Carolina’s claim, but her analysis casts significant
doubt on the practice of descriptive representation. Recall Justice
Kagan’s response to North Carolina’s contention that District 1 was
necessary in order to avoid liability under section 2 of the VRA.196 In
terms that echoed the Court in Shelby County, Justice Kagan
essentially argued that private discrimination in voting has waned
sufficiently in North Carolina—namely that abundant numbers of
white voters are willing to vote for candidates preferred by Black
voters—such that the State could not justify creating this district as
a section 2 district. Before creating a majority-minority district
under section 2, the government must first “point to [a] meaningful
legislative inquiry into what it now rightly identifies as ... whether
a ... [district] created without a focus on race ... could lead to § 2
liability.”197 The Court will no longer presume the need for descriptive representation unless it is absolutely necessary to avoid
potential statutory liability. As the Court continues to abandon
descriptive representation as a legitimate approach to drafting
legislative districts, the effects on voting rights law, and section 2 of
the VRA in particular, are ominous.
So, where is the doctrine likely to go from here? There are at least
three possible avenues for the future. First, Cooper may be like
Shaw when that case first appeared on the scene. Shaw seemed
ominous, but turned out to be less disruptive than it looked at first
blush. Looking back to the Shaw cases, it is natural to understand
that doctrine as a correction on the aggressive use of race in crafting
district lines. Mapmakers adjusted and did not pursue descriptive
representation über alles. As mapmakers adjusted, and the doctrine
lost its raison d’être, given that its goal was not colorblindness but

195. See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1469.
196. See supra Part III.
197. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1471.
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limiting descriptive representation, the Court retreated. Mission
accomplished.
Like Shaw, Cooper seems quite ominous. But the Court in Cooper
may simply be intending to send a message to mapmakers that they
cannot use the VRA pretexually under the guise of providing
descriptive representation. Assuming that the message is received,
the Court could simply withdraw from the racial gerrymandering
context for a time as it did in Cromartie II.
This seems unlikely. As we noted above, Cromartie II was a reflection of a Court that was committed to anticlassification and
preserving room for descriptive representation. The Cooper Court
does not seem to share Cromartie II ’s values.
Second, the Court could adjudicate political gerrymandering cases
in the same way that it resolves racial gerrymandering claims. This
would be to treat political gerrymandering questions as only race
questions. This Term, the Court had a chance to do exactly that, in
the Gill case, argued the first day of the Term.198 If the Court were
to make this move it would remove the “politics, not race” argument
that so obfuscates this area of the law. This would take a lot of
pressure off section 2 of the VRA and might result in more fairness
in the redistricting process. Indeed, voting rights plaintiffs might be
more inclined to bring districting claims as partisan claims than as
racial claims. As we have written before, the move is not as difficult
as some members of the Court and some commentators presume.199
The Court has been reluctant to take this step. But given the Gill
case, we will soon know whether this is a realistic option.
Finally, the Court may simply strike down section 2 of the Act.
This may be the likeliest course of action. As many as four Justices
are on record as skeptical of section 2. The Court may simply be of
the view that section 2 is no longer necessary to enable voters of
color to elect their candidates of choice. It may also be of the view
that it has the responsibility for updating the VRA and making it
consistent with current political realities. The Court is certainly of
the view that mapmakers are not required to include super majorities of voters of color within a district in order for these voters to

198. Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S. argued Oct. 3, 2017).
199. See Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note 61, at 284-94.
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elect their candidates of choice. In fact, the percentage is now well
below 50 percent. The Court alluded to this fact in Cooper.200
Alternatively, or additionally, the Court may be of the view that
these districting fights are truly partisan fights when race is being
used instrumentally. Relatedly, it may view section 2 as a crude and
outmoded way to effectuate representation. It certainly views racebased districting as incompatible with its equal protection jurisprudence. Thus, the same way that the Court used its understanding
of race and its waning influence in American society to strike down
section 4(b) of the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder,201 an outcome
that was presaged in the Court’s decision in Northwest Austin Utility District No. One v. Holder,202 the Court may similarly strike
down section 2. This would mark the triumph of substantive over
descriptive representation once and for all. If descriptive representation is the best way of representing voters of color, and we are not
arguing that it is, the new racial gerrymandering cases may spell
the end for what is left of the voting rights edifice that has been in
place for more than fifty years.
We offer one final observation. In this Article, we have largely assumed a relationship among descriptive representation, an antisubordination framework, and race consciousness. And correspondingly,
we have also assumed a relationship among substantive representation, an anticlassification framework, and race blindness. The association between antisubordination and race consciousness and
anticlassification and race blindness is a standard part of the literature. But adding descriptive representation and substantive representation, respectively, to the equation is not standard and demands
at least flagging, if not some thicker theoretical justification.
A thicker explanation will have to await a different opportunity.
It should suffice for our present purposes to acknowledge the theoretical possibility that descriptive representation can cohabit with
an anticlassification approach. But this uneasy cohabitation is only
possible when descriptive representation is a remedy for racial
discrimination. Otherwise the two concepts are mutual antagonists.

200. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.
201. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625-26 (2013).
202. 557 U.S. 193 (2008).
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Analogously, though substantive representation might be theoretically achievable through an antisubordination framework, whether
the two concepts can cohabit easily depends upon whether substantive representation for voters of color is contingent upon first establishing descriptive representation. Voting rights scholarship has not
fully faced up to this central and theoretical question, which is
currently directing the present and future of voting rights law and
policy. Specifically, whether descriptive representation—and by
extension race consciousness—is only justified in the voting rights
regime to the extent that it is a remedy for racial discrimination in
voting, or whether descriptive representation is a normatively
justifiable end either because descriptive representation is worth
pursuing intrinsically along the lines identified by theorists such as
Anne Phillips and Iris Marion Young203 or relatedly, because descriptive representation is necessarily instrumental to achieving substantive representation for citizens of color.204
To the extent that descriptive representation is only justifiable as
a remedy for racial discrimination in voting, Cooper and the new racial gerrymandering cases may be taking voting rights doctrine in
the right direction. The Court will apply strict scrutiny whenever
the government uses race to draw district lines. But the districts
will survive strict scrutiny when the VRA requires race-conscious
line-drawing. Importantly, the Court will only interpret the VRA to
require race-conscious line-drawing as absolutely necessary to
address racial discrimination in voting. Thus, when the government
cannot justify race-conscious line-drawing on remedial grounds—as
necessary to address racial discrimination—a racial districting plan
will not survive strict scrutiny.
However, to the extent that descriptive representation is a normatively justifiable end outside the discrimination model, Cooper
and the new racial gerrymandering cases are possibly taking us in
the wrong direction. This is because anticlassification’s preference
for race blindness is antithetical to descriptive representation, unless descriptive representation is a remedy for a constitutional

203. See generally ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995); IRIS MARION YOUNG ,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (2011).
204. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 58, at 1430-38.
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violation. Otherwise, as between descriptive and substantive, anticlassification’s approach favors substantive representation to the
exclusion of descriptive representation. Correspondingly, to the
extent that descriptive representation is normatively desirable, that
end is best pursued by an antisubordination approach, mediated by
race consciousness. A constitutional framework that favors anticlassification will necessarily be hostile to descriptive representation
and will only tolerate descriptive representation as a necessary evil
for remedying racial discrimination. And once the Court perceives,
rightly or wrongly, that racial discrimination is no longer a significant barrier to political participation—see Cooper and Shelby County—the Court’s appetite for ratifying state action that attempts to
effectuate descriptive representation will also wane.205 Thus, saving
descriptive representation, if it is worth saving, will require voting
rights scholars, jurists, and activists to move “beyond the discrimination model” to a different model that is compatible with the aims
of VRA, facilitating meaningful and effective participation in the
political process for voters of color.206
CONCLUSION
Cooper v. Harris, which signals the latest installment in a line of
cases we term the new racial gerrymandering cases, is the most
recent case to wrestle with these issues. These cases have a lineage
that traces back to the Shaw cases of the 1990s, a time when the
Court began to struggle with the state of the doctrine as well as its
understanding of the proper conception of representation. The
trade-offs between descriptive and substantive representation made
these questions as difficult as any question faced by the Court. The
fundamental question posed by the new racial gerrymandering
cases is, how should the Court think about descriptive representation in a country that is highly and increasingly polarized along
racial and political identity? This is a question of immediate concern
as we edge closer to another round of apportionment and redistricting. The new racial gerrymandering cases seemed to have moved

205. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349 (2010).
206. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 95 (2013)
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the Court toward colorblindness in redistricting and away from
descriptive representation. If we are right, this means that section
2 of the VRA is as incompatible with the Court’s equal protection
approach as it has ever been.

